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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
The Automobile Inventory:
An End Run Around the Fourth Amendment
In the recent case of Bennett v. State,1 the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals of Oklahoma for the first time addressed the
question of the admissibility of concealed items discovered
in the course of an automobile inventory. While the court
answered in the affirmative, there remained considerable
doubt as to the Oklahoma position on inventory seizures as
well as to the justification of the inventory itself.
Mr. Bennett and companion Travis were stopped by two
Oklahoma City Police officers after the latter had observed
driver Bennett make an illegal lane change. Both Bennett and
Travis were requested by the officers to join them at the rear
of the vehicle. Bennett was informed that he had committed
a traffic violation and was asked for identification. Both de-
fendants were also questioned as to the ownership of the ve-
hicle. At this point, the officers began to make a pat down
search of defendants for weapons. When the search was at-
tempted on Travis, he hit the officer's arm and informed him
he would not allow the officer to search him unless he was
under arrest. Travis was arrested for interfering with a police
officer and Bennett was arrested for the traffic violation. The
officers were on motorcycles, and they summoned a cruiser
to'transport the defendants to the police station. Since the
defendants had made conflicting statements as to the owner-
ship of the vehicle, the car was impounded. While the de-
fendants were in the custody" of one officer, the other began
an immediate inventory of the contents of the automobile
which, in the officer's words, "was required for all automo-
biles which are being impounded."
The officer did not check any items in the trunk, but did
find a small plastic bag of a green leafy substance which he
supposed to be marijuana under the carpet on the passenger's
side of the automobile. The officer continued his search of
the automobile and found a small tin in the glove compart-
4 507 P.2d 1252 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
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ment which contained several partially smoked marijuana
cigarettes. The green leafy substance and the tin were seized
and the defendants were booked on the charge of possession
of marijuana.
At the trial the defendants unsuccessfully attempted to
show that the inventory was a disguise for an unreasonable
search. Clearly, the evidence would not have been admissible
as a fruit of a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest.
Chimel v. California2 limited the scope of such a search to the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate con-
trol," and construed that phrase to mean the area from which
he might gain immediate possession of a weapon or destruc-
tible evidence. Since the defendants in Bennett were under
the control of a police officer when the search occurred, this
exigency did not exist. The Oklahoma Court has made it clear
that no search of a vehicle can be made for a weapon when
the person arrested has left the vicinity of the car and is be-
ing restrained by an arresting officer.3
Furthermore, the evidence would not have been admissi-
ble as a warrantless search for fruits or instrumentalities of
a crime, or for contraband. In Carrol v. United States,4 the
Supreme Court recognized the exigency of the mobility of
the automobile to support a warrantless search but stressed
the requirement for independent probable cause to believe
the automobile contains seizable items. The Court held in
Dykes v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.5 that an arrest for a traf-
fic violation will not provide the required probable cause. The
Oklahoma Court has long held the position that the authority
to search is not conditioned on the right to arrest, but rather
is dependent upon the seizing officer having probable cause
for his belief that the automobile contains contraband, or will
2 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
8 Thompson v. State, 487 P.2d 737 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971);
Lawson v. State, 484 P.2d 1337 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971);
Fields v. State, 463 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970).
4 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
5 391 U.S. 216 (1968) (by implication).
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yield evidence for which the arrest was made.0 Therefore, in
the absence of both probable cause and the need to search
for weapons, the only justification for any intrusion into the
vehicle is an inventory of its contents after impoundment.
The first question regarding the validity of an inventory
seizure is whether the police have the authority to obtain
custody of the automobile in the first instance.7 Ordinarily,
an arrest for a traffic violation will not warrant taking the
vehicle into custody. In each case there is an added factor,
such as intoxication of the driver, or evidence of stolen ve-
hicle that warrants the arrest of the driver and and impound-
ment of the vehicle.8 In Bennett, the court emphasized the
legality of the impound by relying on the conflicting reports
between the defendants as to the ownership of the car and
the right of the officers to remove the vehicle so that it would
not imperil traffic.0 The Supreme Court is apparently in agree-
8 Gaston v. State, 457 P.2d 807 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969);
Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953);
Lawson v. State, 484 P.2d 1337 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
7 United States v. Pannell, 256 A.2d 925 (D.C. 1969); State
v. Montague, 73 Wash. 2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968); Wil-
liams v. United States, 170 A.2d 233 (D.C. 1961).
8 People v. Upton, 287 Cal. App. 2d 677, 65 Cal. Reptr. 103
(1968); Virgil v. Superior Court of Placer County, 268 Cal.
App. 2d 127, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968); Miller v. State, 137
So.2d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
9 OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 955 (1971), in pertinent part, authorizes
any officer of the Department of Public Safety to remove
any vehicle found upon the highway when: (1) Report has
been made that such vehicle is stolen; (2) The officer has
reason to believe the vehicle has been abandoned; (3) The
person driving or in control of such vehicle is arrested for
an alleged offense for which the officer is required by law
to take the person arrested or summoned before a mag-
istrate without unnecessary delay; (4) At the scene of an
accident, when the owner or driver is not in a position to
take charge of his vehicle and direct or request a proper
removal thereof. In addition, every municipality has similar
provisions including the authority to remove a vehicle il-
legally parked. Apparently all are subject tQ the inventory
procedure.
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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ment on this point. In Cooper v. California,0 a state law re-
quired impoundment of a vehicle for forfeiture proceedings
when making an arrest for narcotics violation. While the
term "inventory" was not used, the Supreme Court upheld a
warrantless search at the impound garage, because . . . it
would have been unreasonable to hold that the police, having
to retain the car in their garage for such a length of time,
had no right, even for their own protection, to search it.""
However, in Dyke, the defendants were arrested for reckless
driving and taken to the courthouse. A warrantless search
of their car parked on the street was struck down because
there was... "no indication that the police had purported to
impound or to hold the car, that they were authorized by
any state law to do so, or that their search of the car was
intended to implement the purposes of such custody.' 1 2 Thus,
before any inventory can be made, it must first be shown
that the police have legal custody.
Given a valid impoundment, the courts have taken two
views on the justification of the inventory itself. Both are
based on the notion that the police are somehow responsible
for all personal property in the vehicle. One view treats the in-
ventory as a non-search activity, so long as it is conducted
in good faith on the part of the officer. The true inventory is
not conducted for the purpose of discovering evidence of a
crime or contraband to be used in criminal prosecutions. As
such, the procedure is not a search and need not be justified
within the rubric of the Fourth Amendment.' 3 This view is
questionable. The Supreme Court has noted that the "Fourth
Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public up-
on personal security,"'14 and the inventory would seem to fall
into this definition. Furthermore, in Camara v. Municipal
10 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
1 Id. at 61,62.
12 Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. at 221.
13 State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372 (1970); Heff-
ley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967).
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968).
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Court, 5 the Court applied the strictures of the Fourth Amend-
ment to administrative fire and health inspections, and re-
fused to narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment to "the
typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities
of crime." The Court noted . . . "[i]t is surely anomalous to
say that the individual and his private property are protected
by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is sus-
pected of criminal behavior."18 The same would seem to ap-
ply to the inventory.
Falling within this view are those cases justifying the
inventory solely on the basis of custody of the automobile.
This theory proposes that the valid police custody of the
automobile necessarily includes custody of the contents as
well, and to require the police to obtain a warrant to conduct
a "search" and "find" that which they already had lawful pos-
session of would be "completely discordant with reason.""1
This position seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court de-
cision of Preston v. United States8 which recognized the tradi-
tional rules of standing in allowing an owner to object to an
unreasonable search of his automobile while out of posses-
sion. Thus, it would seem that the warrantless inventory con-
ducted without probable cause can not escape the strictures
of the Fourth Amendment solely on the basis of police custody.
The other view treats the inventory as a search activity
that must meet the test of reasonableness guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment. At least two factors can make an auto-
mobile inventory unreasonable: the intensity of the search,
or the "bad faith" intent on the part of the officer conducting
the inventory. Usually, the former is merely evidence of the
latter, but they are clearly separate questions. It seems clear
that all courts are in agreement on one point. If the conduct
Is 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
16 Id. at 530.
17 State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968).
See also State v. Wade, 190 Kan. 624, 376 P.2d 915 (1962).
18 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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of the police indicates that they are performing an explora-
tory search for incriminating evidence rather than an inven-
tory, then the search cannot be upheld on the inventory
theory.19
However, the question of the intensity of the inventory
has not been answered with the same uniformity.20 California
is one state that has clearly defined the limits in this area.
In Mozzetti v. Superior Court of Sacramento County,21 an
automobile was impounded after an accident, and in the course
of the inventory marijuana was found in a closed suitcase in
the back seat. The state argued that the police have a civil
obligation to inventory the contents of impounded vehicles
for their own protection, and for the protection of the owner.
The court rejected this proposition as being without legal
foundation. The California bailment statutes delineated the
degrees of care required of a bailee according to the type of
bailment involved. The court noted that the police were in-
voluntary bailees of the impounded car and its contents, and
as such they were only required to use slight care. The court
concluded that the police would have met their obligation
to protect the automobile by taking inventory of those items
in plain view and locking the car. While recognizing the right
of police to take note of any objects falling within plain view,
the inventory search into concealed areas was deemed un-
reasonable.
In 1971, the Oklahoma Court seemingly approved of the
19 State v. Montague, 73 Wash. 2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968);
Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967); St. Clair
v. State, 1 Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (Ct. Spec. App. 1967).
20 See, e.g., State v. Olsen, 43 Wash. 2d 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953),
(where a search under the hood of the car was upheld on
the inventory theory); State v. Gowans, 18 Ariz. App. 110,
500 P.2d 641 (1972) (inventory search into trunk upheld);
People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y. 2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323
N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971) (inventory into briefcase held reason-
able); contra Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz. App. 64, 495 P.2d 504
(1972) (inventory into shaving satchel held unreasonable).
21 4 Cal. 3d 735, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
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Mozzetti doctrine in the dicta of Embree v. State.22 In Embree,
the defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana while
seated in his car at a drive-in. Acting only upon informa-
tion that the "defendant was involved with marijuana," the
officers accompanied the defendant in his car to the court-
house where he was booked. Subsequently, the officers ob-
tained a search warrant for the defendant's car parked out-
side the courthouse and discovered two marijuana cigarettes
concealed in the car. The court of criminal appeals reversed,
finding there was no probable cause for either the arrest or
the search. The court added:
To exhaust possible justification for seizure of the
evidence, we note that it was not in clear view or plain
sight. Further, its seizure would not have been law-
ful as a police inventory' of an arrestee's property
removing the Fourth Amendment requirements.23
In support of this statement, the court cited Mozzetti v. Superi-
or Court. The implication of the dicta was far-reaching, since
it indicated that the Oklahoma Court recognized the auto-
mobile inventory as a search activity coming within the rubric
of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, it indicated that an
inventory search into concealed areas of an automobile would
be unreasonable, and any incriminating items discovered in
such areas would be inadmissible.
The defendants in Bennett raised this argument, since
the marijuana was discovered while the officer was conduct-
ing an inventory under the carpet of the passenger side of
the automobile. The court rejected the application of Mozzetti
saying:
The search and seizure of marijuana in that case was
invalid. Not because it was an inventory search, but
because the search was extended beyond the limits of
its intent. [sic]. While the court held that inventories
were valid, they held this one was not because it ex-
ceeded the limits of an inventory search by the of-
22 488 P.2d 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
2 Id. at 593.
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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ficers searching a closed suitcase in the back seat of
the vehicle. In that case, Justice Burke in a concurring
opinion stated:
I concur with the result reached by the majority
therein, for I agree that the opening of petition-
ers suitcase and inspection of its contents con-
stituted an unreasonable search, violating his rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. [citations].
I would emphasize, however, that our decision in no
way interferes with or impinges upon the customary
authority of the police to inspect and inventory all
items of personal property left within plain sight
within an automobile or other vehicle in custody.24
The court's disposition of Mozzetti is confusing, since it stimul-
taneously approves of an inventory under carpets, and con-
demns an inventory of items not in plain view. If the court
is saying the 'plain view' rule of Mozzetti will only apply
to closed suitcases, the position is untenable, since probing
into any concealed area would seem to violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy.2 5
While the Supreme Court has approved an inventory and
seizure under a forfeiture statute,26 it remains unclear how
the Court would treat an inventory after a regular impound-
ment, either conducted at the site of the arrest, or at the
storage lot or garage. The Court declined to reach the ques-
tion in Harris v. United States. 27 The car had been impounded,
and was about to be searched pursuant to police inventory
procedure. Before the search commenced, it began to rain.
When the officer opened the car door to roll up the windows,
the incriminating evidence was discovered in plain view on
the door stripping. The Court said the plain view discovery
of the evidence was not the result of the inventory, but of
a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police
24 Bennett v. State, 507 P.2d at 1254.
25 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20 Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
27 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
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custody. The recent decision of Cady v. Dombrowski2 s pre-
sents a closer case. There, an automobile driven by an out-
of-state policeman was impounded after an accident. After
the driver was taken to the hospital, the officers returned to
the car to search for the policeman's service revolver, since
it was not found on his person. The weapon was discovered
in the trunk, along with other evidence indicating a recent
crime. In upholding the warrantless search, the Supreme Court
relied on two factors. First, the police had exercised a form
of custody over the automobile; second, retrieval of a serv-
ice revolver was "standard police procedure" to protect the
public from the possibility that the weapon would fall into
untrained or malicious hands. While the police had probable
cause to believe the gun was in the car, they did not suspect
at the time of the search that the weapon was connected
with a crime. In effect, the Court justified the inventory on
at least one ground: to protect the public from dangerous
weapons when there is probable cause to believe that one is
located in the automobile.
Aside from these narrow circumstances, any other justi-
fication for the police inventory is subject to scrutiny. Okla-
homa has characterized, as have other jurisdictions, the police
inventory as being necessary to protect the owner from loss,
and for the protection of the officers from false claims of
theft.29 However, when subjected to analysis, this rationale
for the inventory is without substantial merit in an area of
constitutional protection. The inventory list may possibly be
a valid deterrent to false tort claims, especially when the
prospective plaintiff is confronted with a complete list of
items found in the automobile. But it would not preclude all
tort claims, since it could easily be asserted that the pilfered
property was simply not listed.80
28 13 Crim. L. Rep. 3231 (June 21, 1973) (No. 72-586).
29 Gonzales v. State, 507 P.2d 1277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
30 Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz. App. 64, 495 P.2d 504 (1972); Peo-
ple v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y. 2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d
945 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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Furthermore, the bailment laws of Oklahoma are iden-
tical to those of California, and the reasoning of the Mozzetti
opinion is easily applied. Bailments are of two classes: volun-
tary and involuntary.3 1 A voluntary bailment requires the
consented transfer of property from bailor to bailee, while
an involuntary bailment concerns the transfer of property to
another out of necessity in "extraordinary emergencies.
'32
While neither definition precisely covers the automobile im-
poundment situation, it would seem that the police would
more readily be termed involuntary bailees. Accordingly, they
are only bound to use "slight care" for the thing deposited,
33
or, stated conversely, the police would only be liable for gross
negligence in handling the contents of the automobile.34 Con-
sequently, it would seem the police could more than ade-
31 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 441 (1971).
32 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 442 (1971) states that: A voluntary
bailment is made by one giving to another, with his con-
sent, the possession of personal property to keep for the
benefit of the former, or of a third party; the person giving
is called the bailor and the person receiving the bailee.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 443 (1971) states that: An involun-
tary bailment is made: First. By the accidental leaving or
placing of personal property in the possession of any per-
son, without negligence on the part of its owner; or, Second.
In cases of fire, shipwreck, inundation, insurrection, riot,
or like extraordinary emergencies, by the owner of per-
sonal property committing it, out of necessity, to the care
of any person.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 444 (1971) states that: The person
with whom a thing is deposited, in the manner described
in the last section [§ 443], is bound to take charge of it
if able to do so.
33 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 461 (1971) defines a gratutious bail-
ment as one for which the bailee receives no consideration
beyond the mere possession of the thing bailed.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 462 (1971) states that an involuntary
bailment is gratuitous, the bailee being entitled to no re-
ward.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 463 (1971) requires that a gratuitous
bailee must use at least slight care for the thing bailed.
84 OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 6 (1971).
1973]
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quately meet their obligation by listing those items in plain
view found inside the car, rolling up the windows and lock-
ing the doors.
Many states and municipalities contract with local gar-
ages and parking lots for towing and storage of impounded
vehicles. The storage bailee may acquire a lien upon the auto-
mobile and its contents to pay for towing and storage charge.
Accordingly, such a contract is termed bailment for hire,5
in which ordinary care is required of the bailee.30 But even
a duty of ordinary care does not require the storage bailee
to inventory contents not in plain sight in the automobile
he retains.37 Generally, a storage bailee is only responsible
for those concealed items which are ordinarily contained in
the car,38 or those of which the bailee can be charged with
notice.39 Whether dealing with the police or storage bailee,
35 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 465 (1971).
36 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 466 (1971).
37 Giles v. Meyers, 107 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio C.P. 1952); Allen v.
Houserman, 250 A.2d 389 (Del. 1969) (garage owner not
liable for golf clubs in trunk); Ohge v. LaSalle-Randolph
Garage Corp., 328 IM. App. 665, 66 N.E.2d 725 (1946) (not
liable for salesman's goods in trunk); contra Homan v.
Burkhart, 108 Cal. App. 363, 291 P. 624 (1930) (garage
owner liable where attendant promised to watch car and
contents).
38 Polloto v. Hanna, 68 N.E.2d 170 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) (park-
ing lot owner held liable for loss of spare tire and tools
stolen from trunk, but not for theft of other valuables from
same); Barnette v. Casey, 124 W.Va. 143, 19 S.E.2d 621
(1942) (where a bailment formed for car and tools and
equipment that go with it, but not for baggage concealed
in trunk unless notice given).
39 Mee v. Sley System Garages, Inc., 124 Pa. Super. 230, 188
A. 626 (1937) (garage owner liable for loss of large suit-
case and its contents located in back seat since he was
chargeable with notice of its presence and value); Camp-
bell v. Portsmouth Hotel Co., 91 N.H. 390, 20 A.2d 644. (1941)
(hotel garage owner held to have notice of concealed items
in guest's car because guest could not be expected to take
in all baggage and accessories for overnight stay).
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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the owner of an impounded car may always protect himself
by giving express notice of presence of valuable articles in
his automobile.40 Thus, it would seem difficult to justify the
inventory of concealed items in an impounded automobile
on the basis of protecting the police, the storage bailee, or
the owner. This is especially true when the inventory extends
to areas, such as under carpets, where personal property is
not normally kept.
Whatever view the Oklahoma court has on the purpose
and scope of an inventory search, it was made clear in Gon-
zales v. State41 that the police inventory will not be permitted
as a subterfuge for an unreasonable search. The defendant
was arrested for desertion from the Army by the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol. While the arresting officer was removing
the automobile from traffic, a bottle containing bags of white
powder rolled into view. The officer stated he suspected the
substance to be a narcotic, but was not certain. Subsequently,
he instructed the wrecker driver of a storage bailee to in-
ventory the contents of the car, and notify him of any sus-
picious items. The inventory turned up a syringe in a brown
paper sack on the floor board. A field test showed the white
powder to be heroin, and a search warrant for the automobile
was then obtained. The search produced a small clear plastic
box containing additional white powder under the floormat
of the passenger side of the vehicle.42 The powder was sub-
sequently tested to be LSD, which fact was used to convict
the defendant of possession of the drug. The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals reversed, holding all evidence inadmissible as
"fruits of the poisoness tree." The officer merely suspected
that the white powder in the bottle was a narcotic, and this
42 It is interesting to note that the inventory in Bennett ex-
tended under the carpet while the floormats in Gonzales
were apparently untouched.
40 Mulhern v. Public Auto Parks, 296 Ill. App. 238, 16 N.E.2d
159 (1938) (garage owner held liable for loss of suitcase
and valuables in back of car because plaintiff had express-
ly indicated their presence).
41 507 P.2d 1277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
19731
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 9 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol9/iss2/6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
-was held insufficient probable cause for a warrant. Further-
more, the court held that the search by the storage bailee in
the garage could not be classified as a valid "police inven-
tory," because it was not conducted by or in the presence of
an officer of the law, nor was the garageman deputized. There-
fore, the syringe was illegally obtained and could not support
the search warrant producing the LSD. The court stated that:
The mere fact that contraband is discovered during
the legitimate "police inventory" without a warrant
does not render such inventory inadmissible, but
where the "police inventory" is a subterfuge, based
on suspicision that contraband might be stored in the
vehicle, the discovery of such contraband is inadmissi-
ble and the police inventory void ab initio.48
In conclusion, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
has taken a paradoxical approach to the automobile inven-
tory. Even though it is classified as a search coming within
the confines of the Fourth Amendment, the inventory, so
long as conducted in good faith, may extend to at least those
concealed areas that are a part of the automobile. Whether
an inventory into closed containers such as suitcases or purses
would be upheld is a question unanswered.
Each law enforcement agency at the state, county, and
municipal level has its own regulations or procedures regard-
ing the inventory. This has resulted in inconsistencies in the
scope of the search, and only legislation at the state level
will insure uniformity. Statutes are needed to delineate the
procedure, and should be formulated to be consistent with
the bailment laws of the state, i.e. police and storage bailees
will be on constructive notice of those items of value in plain
view and of those not in plain view that are normally found
in an automobile. No liability will lie for those concealed
items of which the police have no notice, either actual or
constructive. Otherwise, the automobile police inventory will
continue to exist in its present flexible state, allowing he
police to do indirectly that which they may not do directly.
H. Wayne Cooper
48 507 P.2d at 1282.
(Vol. 9, No. 2.
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